IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

ATTVIC DOCKET, AKKAD 4

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n re Ap	oplication of:)	Art Unit: 2137
Mehd	i-Laurent AKKAR)	Examiner: Z. A. Davis
Appln.	No.: 09/771,967)	Washington, D.C.
Filed: J	lanuary 30, 2001)	Confirmation No. 2638
(METHOD OF EXECUTING A CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL BETWEEN TWO ELECTRONIC)))	

DECLARATION OF INVENTORS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 1.131

Each of the undersigned, Mehdi-Laurent Akkar and Paul Dischamp, is a co-inventor of the above-identified application and we are collectively the inventors of the above-identified application.

. We understand that the examiner has applied U.S. Patent No. 6,594,761 to Chow in a rejection of the above-identified patent application.

We hereby declare that the aforementioned patent by Chow is not prior art to our invention, inasmuch as we had actually reduced to practice, and thus made our invention, prior to the June 9, 1999 filing date of Chow.

- 1. In evidence of such reduction to practice, we attach herewith a copy of a description of the invention and a listing of computer code as Exhibit A, having a date (redacted) which is prior to the June 9, 1999, filing date of Chow.
 - 5. The first page of Exhibit A states as follows:

Anti-DPA Improvements in S-BOXes:

<u>Authors</u>: Mehdi-Laurent AKKAR Paul DISCHAMP

<u>Date</u>: REDACTED

1 - Explanations

- The 8 S-BOXes are processed randomly, so as to:
 - divide the height of peaks by 8 on the signal;
 - avoid a 1-round attack since it is impossible to know which S-BOX is processed.
- Bitwise inverted DES is carried out randomly (one of the characteristics of DES is that this is possible (see Schneier or Stinson)). For that purpose, a second set of bitwise complemented S-BOXes is used both on input and output, so that any attempt to predict which bits circulate within the component will be erroneous. However, at the final XOR output of each round, the output is once again the appropriate one and has to be re-complemented (in the case of an inverted round). If this is done, at some point, whatever the round (whether it is inverted or not), the message will be available in its "clear" form, so that DPA can then be applied. Therefore, before and after each round, the left part of the message is randomly complemented or not (in the normal case: inverse, and then inverse, OR non-inverse, and then non-inverse // in the inverted case: inverse, and then non-inverse, OR non-inverse, and then inverse). For this purpose, the following steps are carried out: "XORing" is performed with X, and then with X, when nothing has to be changed, and "XORing" is performed with X and X-1 (X's complement), thus yielding the inverse. To make this inconspicuous, X is used in such a way that XORing with X and X⁻¹ consumes the same amount of processing (in this case, 104 and 151). X could also be chosen randomly.
- Finally, in order to avoid an attack against a large number of messages in which the random generator's bias could be used, the difference between the normal/inverted DES is checked.

The Code of our DES using these countermeasures is as follows:

- 6. Exhibit A in its entirety was sent, the day after its creation, by mail to our patent attorney, Mr. J. Barbin, at Cabinet Bonnet-Thiron. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit B to this declaration.
 - Exhibit B states as follows:

Mr J. Barbin Cabinet Bonnet-Thirion 12, avenue de la Grande-Armée 75017 Paris

Re: filing of a Soleau enveloppe (CSP99010)

Dear Sirs

Please file on our behalf the enclosed six pages in a Soleau enveloppe in the name of De La Rue Cartes & Systèmes. Thank you in advance and best regards.

D Pottier

- 8. All of work done in preparation of Exhibit A was done by us or under the direct supervision of at least one of us, and the computer code shown implements the claimed invention.
- 9. The work reflected in Exhibit A was conducted in France after January 1, 1996, and prior to June 9, 1999.

We hereby declare that all the statements made herein of our own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code and the such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issued thereon.

Date:October 27th, 2009	/ Mehdi-Laurent Akkar/ Mehdi-Laurent Akkar
Date:October 27 th , 2009	/ Paul Dischamp/ Paul Dischamp

Améliorations anti-DPA sur les S-BOX:

Auteurs:

Mehdi-Laurent AKKAR

Paul DISCHAMP

Date:

REDACTED

1 - Explications

- Les 8 S-BOX sont traitées dans un ordre aléatoire, ce qui permet:
 - de diviser la hauteur des pics par 8 sur le signal.
 - d'éviter une attaque en 1 coup car l'on ne sait pas quelle est la S-BOX traitée.
- De manière aléatoire on effectue le DES de manière inversée bit à bit (une des caractéristique du DES est que c'est possible (cf. Schneier ou Stinson)). Pour cela on utilise un deuxième jeu de S-BOX complémentées bit à bit en entrée et en sortie, ce qui fausse toute prédiction sur les bit circulant dans le composant. Cependant à la sortie du xor final de chaque round: la sortie est à nouveau la bonne et il faut (dans le cas d'un round inversé) la recomplémenter. Si l'on procède ainsi, quel que soit le round (inversé ou non), à un moment le message se retrouve en "clair" et l'on peut alors appliquer un DPA. De ce fait avant et après chaque round on complémente ou non de manière aléatoire la partie gauche du message (dans le cas normal: inverse puis inverse, OU non inverse puis non inverse // dans le cas inversé: inverse puis non inverse, OU non inverse puis inverse). Pour cela on procède ainsi: on "xore" avec X puis avec X quand on ne veut rien faire et l'on "xore" avec X et X-1 (complément de X) ce qui donne l'inverse. Pour que ce ne soit pas visible on utilise X tel que le xor avec X et X-1 consomme autant (dans ce cas 104 et 151). On pourrait également utiliser X tiré aléatoirement.
- Enfin afin d'éviter une attaque sur un grand nombre de messages où le biais du générateur aléatoire pourrait être utilisé, on contrôle la différence de DES effectué normal/inversé.

Le Code de notre DES utilisant ces contre-mesures est:

XTRN	DATA	(keyd	CS.XXX)	; 7 bytes for	the deskey
XTRN	DATA	(inpd	cs)	8 bytes for	the message
XTRN	DATA	(buffe	≍)	8 bytes for	a buffer
XTRN	DATA	(sho	ac)	t byte for	
XTRN	DATA	Üpq	B()	1 byte for	
XTRN	r	ATA	(DES	pointer)	; I byte for the permutation
XTRN	Ε	ATAC	(germ	ĭ .	: 8 bytes for the permutation tal
DES	Thire me	domise	s avec	anti DPA (SP	er (P)
	de xor LO				
			*****	********	**********
			*****	*********	***********************
			*****		***************************************
	XTRN XTRN XTRN XTRN XTRN XTRN XTRN	XTRN DATA XTRN DATA XTRN DATA XTRN DATA XTRN DATA XTRN L XTRN L	XTRN DATA (inpd XTRN DATA (buff XTRN DATA (sho XTRN DATA (po XTRN DATA XTRN DATA	XTRN DATA (imples) XTRN DATA (buffe) XTRN DATA (buffe) XTRN DATA (pers) XTRN DATA (pers) XTRN DATA (pers)	XTRN DATA (inpdes) ; 8 bytes for XTRN DATA (buffer) ; 8 bytes for XTRN DATA (bres) ; 1 byte for XTRN DATA (pex) ; 1 byte for XTRN DATA (DES_pointer)

EXHIBIT A

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Reset_p		MOV Roupperm; Reset perm hai MOV AumFFH	f to FF
		MOV WRILA INC RO CINE RO, Sperm+4, Reset_p	
		MOV_slareg_#7 : Select a randor	n value between 0 and 7 in keydes
Rand:		MOV A_shreq CLR C SUBB A.#4 MOV A_shreq INC MSN	
		ADD.A.Wkeydes MOV RO.A MOV A.@RO	
MSN:		SJMP MSN_end ADD A_#keydes-4 MOV Ro.A	
MSN_o	uł·	MOV A.@RO SWAP A	
Сопра		ANL A.MOTH ADD A.Mperts MOV RO.A	; Position in perm using this random value
	-	MOV A.@RO MOV RI.A	
		MOV A keydes+4 CINE A MOFFH.p_1	
		CINE RI. MFFH. Nec.	; Check if position already used
p_2:		MOV A_shreg SWAP A ORL A,#OFH SIMP Next_index	; Write value in position
ν <u>-</u>		MOV A.R.I ANL A.MOFH CINE A.MOFH, NONL, P	; Second permutation
		MOV A.@RO ANL A.MOPOH ORL ASkreg SIMP Next_index	; Write value in position
Next_p:		DEC RO CINE RO, #perm-1, Compare MOV RO, #perm+7 SIMP Compare	; Move on to sext position
Nest_in	dex:	MOV @RO,A DEC_shreg MOV A_streg CINE A.ROFFH.Rand	
p_coad:		MOV A.keydes+4 CINE A.#0FFH.p_end IMP Crease_perm	; Loop for second permutation
Retr_pr	na:	MOV R0,#perm MOV R1,#keydes+4	
		MOV A. ØR! ANI. A. ØR! MOV ØR!O.A INC R! INC R! CINE RU. #perm+3. Rest_pris	; Retrieve data saved in keydes during first permutation
		MOV A.DES_pointer ANL A.@RO MOV @RO.A MOV DES_pointer,#0	; Reset DES_pointer
		MOV RO.#keydes	; Clear keydes zone
Clear_I	at:	CLR A MOV @RO, A INC RO CINE RO. //keydes+7, Clear_kd	
Byte_p	ж	MOV RI.#pcm+7 MOV A.@R! ANL A.#0F0H SWAP A MOV _shregA JZ Try_again	: Bit position
		MOV R2,#perm+7	; Byte position
Next_n	love:	MOV RO, ARZ MOV A. @RO ANL A. MOFH MOV _Ipcilla	; Position on Imput buffer
		ADD A, Mouffer MOV RQ, A MOV A, 29R0 MOV RQ, A	; Save byte in RO
		MOV DPTR,#MASK MOV A_starg MOVC A_BA+DPTR ANL A_RO MOV B_A	; B now contains stacked bit
		MOV A_spent CLR C SUBB A_shreg IZ Copy INC Shift_left	; Shift bit to final position

XRL A.93H MOV keydes+3.A : RDS

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BJ_END: P2_JTab: B3_LSN: B4_MSN: B+_END: B4_LSN:

BO_END; ORL MOV impdes A SIMP PC7_Loop BO_LSN: CLR
MOV C.BIT24
RLC A
MOV C.BIT1
RLC A
MOV C.BIT5
RLC A
SJMP B0_END BI_MSN; CLR A.
MOV C.BITIS
RRC A.
MOV C.BITIS
RRC A.
MOV C.BITIS
RRC A.
RR.
RR. BI_END: ORL A impdes+1 MOV impdes+1,A SJMP PC2_Loop BI_LSN: CLR A
MOV C.BIT6
RLC A
MOV C.BIT21
RLC A
MOV C.BIT10
RLC A
SIMP B1_END B2_MSN CLR A
MOV C.BIT12
RRC A
MOV C.BIT19
RRC A
MOV C.BIT13
RRC A
RRC A
RR BZ_END: B2_LSN: CLR A
MOV C.BIT1
RLC A
MOV C.BIT26
RLC A
MOV C.BIT8
RLC A
SIMP B2_END B1_MSN: CLR A
MOV CBIT27
RRCA
MOV CBIT16
RRC A
RRC A
RR
RR SIMP BD_MSN SIMP BD_LSN SIMP BI_LSN SIMP BI_LSN SIMP BI_LSN SIMP BI_LSN SIMP BI_MSN CUR A MOV C.BIT20 RLC A MOV C.BIT13 RLC A MOV C.BIT12 RLC A SIMP B3_ENO CLR A
MOV C.BIT31
RRC A
MOV C.BIT32
RRC A
MOV C.BIT41
RRC A
RR
RR
RR

RRC A MOV C.BIT14 RRC A RR RR

ORL A.inpdes+2 MOV inpdes+2.A SIMP PCZ_Loop ORL A.inpdex+3 MOV inpdex+3.A JMP PC2_Loop

ORL A.inpdes+4 MOV impdes+4,A JMP PC2_Loop

CLR A MOV C.BIT37

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ARI

		mov sert seri seri	ARI buffer+O.A buffer+I.A buffer+I.A buffer+I.A
		mov sat sat sat sat	A.R.1 buller+0.A buller+1.A buller+2.A buller+3.A
splopi:		mov mov XRL azil mov musi mov JMP	R6,#\$ A.093H A.094H A.#00001111 B.#10 AB DPTR.#D2 @A+DPTR
MLA2211:	LIMP	SWAPLR	*
02:		mov teult mov IZ	RO,#0 R1.#inpdes SPLOP A,R6 ML,A2211
		mov lcall mov !Z	RO,#4 R1.Hinpdes+1 SPLOP A.R6 MLA2211
		mov icali mov JZ	RO.#8 R1.#inpdes+2 SPLOP A.R6 MLA2211
		mov leath mov JZ	RO,#12 R1,#inpdes+3 SPLOP A.R6 MLA2211
		mov nov lcall mov IZ	RO,#16 R.J./Airpdes+4 SPLOP A.R6 ME.A2211
		mov teali mov 1Z	R0,#20 R1,finpdes+5 SPLOP A.R6 MLA2211
		mov leail mov IZ	RO.#24 RJ.#impdes+6 SPLOP A.R6 MLA2211
		mov icall mov IZ	RO,#28 R(,#impdes+1 SPLOP A,R6 MLA221
		mov leati mov IZ	RO, #0 R1. Himpdes SPLOP A.R6 MLA221
		mov icali mov JZ	R0,#4 R1,#impdes+ SPLOP A,R6 MLA221
		mov leaft mov IZ	ROJES R.I., Kimpdeser: SPLOP A., R6 MLA221
	٠.	mov icali mov IZ	RO,#12 R1,#inpdes+; SPLOP A,R6 MLA271
		mov lealt mov 12	RD,#16 R1,#inpdes+ SPLOP A,R6 MLA221
		mov leal1 mov IZ	RO,#20 RI,#Inpdes+, SPLOP A,R6 MLAZZI
•			

CM rdm ordre Sbox (ani A.#00000111b)

IPPERM: MOV R0,#inpdes+7-A
A.@Ri
A
A.@Ri
Ri
Ri,#buffer+8.[Pl
Rt)
RO,#inpides-1.[P2 RLC RLC XCH RLC XCH INC CINE DEC CINE A,093H A,094H RJ,A A,81 B,83 AB A mov xci mov ani mov mui inc ii inv: DPTR,#MI,AI MLAI: @A+DPTR norma inver mov inc CINE IMP XXX+I,A A.XXX+1 A A.#125.norma2 inver MOA MOA MOA R4,#10J R5,#104 DPTR,#SPYABO XXX,DPH jmp HLAH A,XXXX+1 dec CINE RMP XXXX+1.A A A,#115,inver2 norma ; Vicer le pt virg ; CM normalt 151 et IPTAB MLAII MLAII: mov ir ani A#1 mov mui inc A.R3 A B,#3 AB A DPTR.#MLA6662 @A+DPTR JMP JMP aortza666 inver666 лме ML.A666 R3,#151 MLA666 IP-I SUBROUTINE Imput BUFFER 0---7 Output INPOES 0---7 38 5 46 18 52 26 31 38 5 46 14 54 22 53 30 37 5 47 15 55 22 63 31 38 5 46 14 54 22 53 30 37 5 45 15 32 16 129 36 44 12 52 20 60 28 35 3 43 11 54 19 59 27 34 242 10 50 18 58 26 33 141 9 49 17 57 25

IPMINI;

CALL

MOVE_PERM

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RICHSH:
                                                                             MOV RO, #keydes+3
RL, A
RL, A
RL, A
RL, A
MOV B, A
 RSHIF:
                                                                            MOV A. @RO
RR A
MOV R.I.A
MOV R.I.A
ANT. A. #OFFH
XRL A.B
MOV @RO.A
MOV @RO.A
MOV @RO.A
MOV @CO.A
MOV @RO.A
MOV B.RI
RO.RO.
                                                                            MOV A.B
RL A
RL A
RL A
XCH A.keydes+3
ANL A.ROFTH
XRL A.keydes+3
XCH A.keydes+3
ANL A.NOFTH
XRL A.keydes+3
MOV keydes+3, A
                                                                             DINZ RZ,RIGHSH
RET
               COMPUTE NUMBER OF SHIFT
   ROUND : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
  ENCRYPTION: 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 8
 DECRYPTION: 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
NBSHIFT:
                                                                            MOV A_shreg
RL A
MOV C_ACC_0
MOV _shreg_A
XRL A_#9FH
NZ SHINE
MOV _shreg_#7EH
 SHINE:
                                                                             MOV
DEC
INZ
MOV
                                                                                        A_bpcmt
A
SHNEI
                                                                                          streg #76H
SHNE I:
                                                                             CLR
INC
INC
INC
                                                                                        A SHINEZ
 SHNE2:
                                                                             mov
add
mov
INC
inc
SP TABLES
: TABLES SEGMENT CODE
: RSEG TABLES
 CSEG AT 08D00H
```

SPTAB0:	DB		JH.DJDH.01CH.08AH.0F0H.0CFH
		DB	072H.04CH.04DH,0F2H,0EDH,033H,016H,0E0H
		DB	08FH,028H,07CH,082H,062H,037H,0AFH,059H
		DB	087H.0E0H.000H.03FH.009H.04DH.0F3H.094H
		BG	016H_0A3H_058H_083H_0F2H_04FH_067H_030H
		DB	049H,072H,0BFH,0CDH,0BEH,098H,081H,07FH
		D8	0A5H,0DAH,0A7H,07FH,089H,0C8H,078H,0A7H
		DB	08CH.005H.072H.084H.052H.072H.04DH.038H

008H,035H,006H,0ABH,0ECH,040H,079H,034H
DB 017H,DFEH,0EAR,047H,0A3H,0SFH,0D5H,A48H
DB 00AH,0BCH,009H,03H,007H,097H,0BBH
DB 01CH,031H,0A1H,07ALD,01H,059H,069H,096H
DB 01CH,031H,0A1H,07ALD,01H,059H,098H,096H
DB 088H,041H,045H,09BH,05EH,020H,082H,035H
DB 088H,041H,045H,09BH,05EH,020H,082H,035H
DB 09FH,0B1H,0D2H,041B,05H,001H,041H,041H,041H
DB 09FH,0B1H,0D2H,045H,021H,04EH,02DH,0D8H

SPTABZ: .DB

ODBH.059H.0F4H.0EAH.055H.0REH.025H.0D5H

DB 036H.0F2H.0DAH.01AH.04BH.0ABH,0ABH,025H.025H

DB 046H.016H.08EH.0BFH,0ABH.0EDH.0D4H.01BH

DB 035H.054H.014H.0E3H.014H.07BH.0BBH.0ABH

DB 046H.0C5H.01BH.0BDH.0E5H.01H.059H.05AH

DB 099H.0E0H.08TH.01BH.00H.07BH.07BH.0BEH

DB 077H.0E8H.08TH.01BH.00H.07BH.07BH.0ABH

DB 07AH.01FH.06BH.05CH.0A9H.086H.054H.0F9H

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De:

Paris, REDACTED

D. POTTIER

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Monsieur J. BARBIN Cabinet Bonnet-Thirion 12 avenue de la Grande Armée 75017 PARIS

Votre Ref.

f. -

Notre Ref.

DLRCS/DP/DEV/dp/99108

Objet:

Dépôt d'une enveloppe Soleau (CSP 99010)

Monsieur,

Je vous prie de bien vouloir déposer pour nous les six feuilles jointes dans une enveloppe Soleau au nom de De La Rue Cartes & Systèmes.

Vous en remerciant d'avance, je vous prie de croire, Monsieur, à l'assurance de mes sentiments distingués.

D. Pottier

EXHIBIT B